

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

COPY NO. SERIES B

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 24, 1967

SUBJECT: Non-Proliferation Treaty (U)

PARTICIPANTS: Berndt von Staden, Counselor, German Embassy  
Robert H. Kranich, Chief, Political Affairs  
Division, ACDA/IR

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I called in Mr. von Staden and provided him with the text of the Oral Note that Ambassador McGhee had given Chancellor Kiesinger on February 22. I suggested that after the Federal Republic had had a chance to study the draft Summary of Interpretations incorporated in the Note we would be pleased to learn to what extent in his government's judgment it covered the points raised in the oral presentation of Minister von Lilienfeld to Mr. Fisher on February 22.

Turning to the question of eventual Soviet acceptance or lack of objection to various interpretations of the treaty, I asked von Staden whether in his government's view Soviet silence would suffice. I mentioned that in von Lilienfeld's presentation he had said that an official expression of consent from the Soviets was not necessary. Von Staden said that if there were agreement to the interpretations as between the US and its allies that the absence of any explicit challenge by the Soviet Union would suffice. However, he thought this not likely and the problem would arise when his government or the US or other governments would need to publicly delineate these

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interpretations in order to obtain parliamentary support for the treaty. The Soviet Union probably would not at that time remain silent and by challenging some of the more important interpretations it would place very serious obstacles in the path of treaty acceptance.

Mr. von Staden then turned to the question of Article III, and emphasizing that he was speaking only personally he reiterated his view that the Article III question would in the long run create the most difficulty. He cited several German nuclear scientists, who although opposed to the MLF and German possession of the bomb, sincerely believed that the "controls" called for in the Article III formulation would not only hinder German peaceful nuclear developments but would be exploited by Soviet bloc inspecting personnel for industrial espionage purposes.

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